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ON AN ERROR IN GROVE'S PROOF
Graham PRIEST and Koji TANAKA
Nearly a decade has past since Grove [1988] gave a semantics for the AGM
postulates. The semantics, called sphere semantics, provided a  new
perspective of the area of study, and has been widely used in the context of
theory or belief change. However, the soundness proof that Grove gives in
his paper contains an error. In this note, we will point this out and give two
ways of repairing it.
We follow Grove in matters of notation. To make this paper self-con-
tained, we start by rehearsing some. Let L be a propositional language. Let
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sentence, 1,41 is the set of all members of M
L  c o n t a i n i n g  A .  
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the theory FIX. I f  i s  a set of sentences, C n ( )  is the set of logical con-
sequences of / .  I f  T is a theory in L, c(A) is a certain subset of M
L  — i n t u i -tively, the smallest "sphere" containing all extensions of T, some of which
contain A— and T + A is defined as t ( I A M c(A)). For future reference,
T I A, the expansion of T by A, is Cn(T { A  }
).We can now state the problematic step in Grove's proof. On p. 161, in
verifying the postulate +7, two successive lines of the proof are:
1,41 I B 1  n  c(A) C  1 ,4 1  I B I  c ( A  A B)
IBI n  IT + Al C  ICn ((A ,B ))1  n  c(A A
B )
The left-hand side of this step relies on the fact that:
IT+ Al C  I A I  n  c(A)
It(1,41 n  c(A))I C  I A I  n  c(A)
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But in general It(X)1 X .  Let X be the class of all maximal consistent sets
minus any one of them. t(X) is the set of all tautologies, since for any non-
tautology there is more than one maximal consistent set which does not
contain it. Hence It(X)I = M
L
.  A  s i m i l a r  
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+8.
The proble  can be repaired as fo llows.
2 W e  d o  n o t  
r e p l a c e  
I A I  
n  c
( A )
by IT + AI at this stage of the proof, but simply carry it  along. The proofthen becomes:
3
1/11 n  IBI n  c(A)
IAI n  IBI n  c(A)
t(IA A BI n  (
( A  A  
B ) )
T-FA A B
C I A I  n  IBI n  c(A A B)
C I A  A BI n  c(A A B)
C t ( I B I  n  IAI n  c(A))
t(IAI n  c(A)) I B
By definition, t(IAI n  c(A)) ,
T +  A .  
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,
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required.
Now this new proof requires the function t  to satisfy the condition that
t(S) / A = t(S n  IA1) for any S C M
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A - )  B is the material conditional -  A y B.
Proof Right-to-left: Suppose that for some sentence B, B E  t(S n  IA I).
Then for all x E  S f l A I
,  B  E  x .  
H e n c e ,  
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entails A B ,  A -4 B E x for all x E  I -  AI. So A -) B  E x' for all x' E S
n (IAI U I -  AI) = S. Hence A -> B E t(S). Thus B E Cn(S =  t(S) /
 (by detachment for the material conditional). Since B is an arbitrary sen-
tence, t(S n  IA1) C t(S) / A.
Left-to-right: Suppose that for some sentence B, B E t(S) I A. Then B E
Cn(t(S) U {A  }
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detachment. Thus B E t(S n  IA I). QED.
This proof is perfectly correct in classical logic, but it may fail in a non-
classical logic, particularly one where material detachment, the disjunctive
syllogism, fails, as it does in standard relevant and paraconsistent logics. In
2 As was pointed out by Grove in correspondence.
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Tanaka [19961. A s imilar proof was given by Grove in correspondence.
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other words, the argument will fail if  one generalises Grove's semantics to
non-classical logics, as is entirely possible.
6 Is there any way that the proof may be repaired more generally? The an-
swer is yes. An elementary class is one of the form IB1 for some sentence B.
It is well known that if  X is an elementary class then It(X)1. X. Moreover,
the proof of this fact is a quite general, model-theoretic, one, and has noth-
ing to do with classical logic.
7 H e n c e ,  i f  
w e  
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be an lementary class, Grove's original argument goes through.
8 This constraint means, in effect, that every sphere represents a theory that
is finitely axiomatisable. This is not an implausible constraint if  one takes it
that spheres represent theories that are accessible to the belief-reviser in
question, and that the reviser is a finite agent. In this way, Grove's con-
struction may be liberated from the vicissitudes of classical logic.
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